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COMMENT ON RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS.
HERBE:T

0

J.

FmIEDMAN.'

Cruel and Inusual Punishment.-A case recently decided by the United
States Supreme Court has excited a great deal of comment throughout the
country. The point that was passed upon was so novel, and the subject matter
so unusual, that even a layman stopped to read the comments he found in his
daily paper.
The case was that of Weenms v. United States. There the court was called
upon to pass upon the meaning and construction of a provision in the Bill of
Rights of the Philippine Islands similar to the eighth amendment to the Federal
Constitution, which provides that:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted."
The plaintiff in error, Weems, was the acting disbursing officer of the bureau
of coast guards and transportation of the government of the Philippine Islands.
He was indicted because he corruptly and with intent to deceive and defraud the
government, did falsify the records and cash book of the captain of the board of
Manila, the bureau of coast guards and transportation. He was found guiltyand
the court thereupon imposed upon him the following sentence: To the penalty
of i5 years of 'Cadena' and to pay a fine of 4,ooo pesetas.
By the provisions of the code prevailing in the Philippine Islands, a man
who is bound to serve "Cadena" punishment must always carry a chain at the
ankle, hanging from the wrist, and be employed at hard and painful labor.
Besides this punishment certain civil disabilities are inflicted upon him, which it
is not necessary to mention here.
An appeal was taken from the supreme court of the Islands to the United
States Supreme Court and it was there urged that this sentence violated the
provision of the Bill of Rights of the Islands, which forbids the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment.
The court seemed to be of the opinion that punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; that "such a punishment implies
something inhuman and barbarous," and that the punishment in this case was
cruel in its excess of imprisonment and unusual in its character. Thus it said:
"The court recognizes the difficulty of defining accurately what is meant by
cruel and unusual punishment."
And further that:
"There are degrees of homicide that are not punished so severely, nor are
the following crimes: Misprision of treason, inciting rebellion, conspiracy to destroy the government by force, recruiting soldiers in .the United States to fight
against the United States, forgery of letters patent, forgery of bonds and other
instruments for the purpose of defrauding the United States, robbery, larceny and
other crimes."
'Of the Chicago bar.
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* The court also pointed out that in the Philippine Islands more heinous
crimes were not more severely punished than the crime in this case, and declared:
"In other words, the highest punishment possible for a crime which may
cause the loss of many thousands of dollars and to prevent which the duty of the
state should be as eager to prevent as the perversion of truth in a public document, is not greater than that which may be imposed for falsifying a single item
of a public account. And this contrast shows more than different exercises of
legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It condemns the sentence in this
case as cruel and unusual. It exhibits a difference between unrestrained power
and that which is exercised under the spirit of constitutional limitations formed
to establish justice. The state thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The
purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting severity, its repetition is preveftted, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal."
Justice White wrote a very powerful dissenting opinion. He said he felt
that the court was confusing the meaning of harshness of punishment with the
phrase "cruel and unusual punishment." He pointed out that what was a cruel
and unusual punishment had, to be determined by the custom that had been in
force at any particular time and place, and that during the Spanish reign of the
Philippines this punishment was not considered an unusual or a cruel one.
He showed that the provision in reference to cruel and unusual punishment was
originally taken from the well-known act of Parliament of 1689, and that this
Act was in regular form a consequence of the Declaration of Rights of the same
year; that the cruel punishments against which the Bill of Rights provided were
the atrocious and inhuman punishments that had been inflicted in the past upon
the persons of criminals, and that the unusual punishments provided qgainst
were certain illegal punishments that had been complained of. These complaints
were:
First-That customary modes of bodily punishment such as whipping and
the use of the pillory had been applied to so unusual a degree as to cause them to
be illegal; and,
Second-That in some cases an authority to sentence to perpetual imprisonment had been exerted under the assumption that power to do so resulted from
the existence of judicial discretion to sentence to imprisonment, when it was
unusual, and that therefore it was illegal to inflict life imprisonment in the
absence of express legislative authority. He said that the prohibitions, although
conjunctively stated, were really disjuncted and embraced the following:
a. Prohibitions 'against a resort to the inhuman bodily punishments of the
past.
b. Or where certain bodily punishments were customary, a prohibition
against their infliction to such an extent as to be unusual and consequently
illegal.
c. Or the infliction under the assumption of the exercise of judicial discretion, of unusual punishments not bodily, which could not be imposed except by
express statute, or which were beyond the jurisdiction of the court to impose.
That in England it was nowhere deemed that any theory of proportional
punishment was suggested by the Bill of Rights or that a protest was thereby
intended against the severity of punishments.
Justice White further declared that the first "Crimes Act" of the United
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States prescribed punishment for crime utterly without reference to any assumed
rule of proportion or of a conception of a right in the judiciary to supervise th
action of Congress in respect to the severity of punishment, excluding always
the right to impose as a punishment cruel bodily punishments which were- prohibited.
"From all the citations which have been stated," he continued, "I can deduce
no ground whatever which, to my mind, sustains the interpretation now given to
the cruel and unusual punishment clause; on the contrary, in my opinion, the
review which has been made demonstrates that the word 'cruel' as used in the
amendment forbids only the law-making power, in prescribing punishment foi
crime and the courts in imposing punishment, from inflicting unnecessary bodily
suffering through a resort to inhuman methods for causing bodily torture, like or
which are of the nature of the cruel method of bodily torture which had been
made use of prior to the Bill of Rights in 1689, and against the recurrence of
which the word 'cruel' .was used in that instrument."
He further said that the decision of the majority in this case is in direct
conflict with the conception that, what is generically included in the words employed in the Constitution, is to be ascertained by considering their origin and
their significance at the time of their adoption into the constitution.
By the interpretation now adopted by the court, two results are accomplished. Justice White asserted:
a. The clause against cruel punishments, which was intended to prohibit
inhumane and barbarous punishments, is so construed as to limit the discretion
of the law-making power in determining the mere severity with which punishments not of the prohibited character may be prescribed, and
b. By interpreting the word "unusual" adopted for the sole purpose of limiting judicial discretion in order thereby to maintain the supremacy of the lawmaking power, so as to cause the prohibition to bring about the directly contrary result, that is, to expand the judicial power by endowing it with a vast
authority to control the legislative department in the exercise of its discretion to
define and punish crime.
If the Supreme Court in this decision had in mind the idea that any punishment was cruel and unusual where the punishment was not in proportion to
the crime, it certainly has taken a new and advanced step in the interpretation
of the eighth amendment-an interpretation which revolutionizes all theories of
punishment that have ever prevailed.
There probably never was a legislative body that could with absolute justice
proportion punishment to the crime, and where as we, in the United States, have
a complex system of government, with the legislatures of many different states
having full sovereign right to determine the length of imprisonment or punishment to be meted out to every offender, the problem becomes an almost helpless
one.
In one state grand larceny may be punished by imprisonment of from 5
to 2o years, whereas in another state for committing the same offense, the
criminal can be sentenced from x to 5 years. In one state, a jury whose sympathies are most violently appealed to, determines the sentence; in another
state a judge, without any great experience in criminal matters, determines'
how long the victim must stay in the penitentiary.
Who can determine whether it is a more serious crime to commit the act
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of forgery than that of larceny? Who is to say whether burglary or perjury
should be the more severely condemned? Who is willing to pass upon the
merits or demerits by which a man is to be judged, should he be found guilty
of obtaining goods by false representations on the one hand, or of committing
embezzlement -on the other.
If we are to take literally the opinion of the Supreme Court and say that
the legislature must fix the punishment according to the heinousnesi of a
crime, an almost insurmountable obstacle is confronting the administration of
the criminal law. It may be that we are coming to the time when punishments
will be standardized. Possibly we shall some day come to the opinion that
a judge who occasionally sits in the criminal court should not determine what
a sentence may be, much less a jury who happens to hear only an occasional
case.
This is the day of commissions, and possibly we may feel that civil;zation
will be further advanced and justice at all events promoted by having a commission to determine the punishment of the criminal, and to unify the laws so
far as they relate to mere punishment.
Insanity as a Defense.-In the case of People vs. Coleman, 91 N. E. 368,
the court held that an affidavit onl which a motion for a new trial was based
where the question of sanity of the defendant was first raised, containing an
unqualified assertion that the defendant was insane did not rise to the dignity
of evidence, indicating that the defendant's mind was sq affected that he did
not know the nature and quality of the act he committed; or did not know
that it was wrong.
The question of the sanity of the defendant was not raised until after
the trial. This case can hardly be said to be an authority on the question of
insanity. The court did not find it necessary nor did it attempt to go into a
careful discussion of the law bearing on insanity.
In the case of Snell vs. Weldon, 243 Ill. 496, the plaintiff in erros attempted
to set aside the will of the testator, Thomas Snell, on the grounds that the
testator was not of sound mind and memory and had insane delusions regarding
the complainant.
On this point the court said:
"The establishment of an insane delusion involves proof that the testator in
this case believed certain things concerning his son which did not exist; that he
had no evidence on which to base such belief; that the things which he believed,
were false and were adhered to .by the testator after their falsity had been
shown by reasonable evidence; that the things which the testator believed
were such things as no person of sound mind would believe; that the testator
refused to yield or give up such irrational belief in the face of such reasonable
evidence as would convince an ordinarily sound and healthy mind; and lastly,
that the existence of such delusion was present in the mind of the testator and
exercised a controlling influence over him at the time the will was executed."
It might be interesting to discuss the question whether the same tests are
always applied to determine whether, a man is insane. Could a man, for example,
be found insane so far as the commission of a crime might be concerned, and
at the same time be found sane so far as the making of a wilt might be in
question.
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Of course, if the rigid rules of the M'Naghten case are to be applied, it
would seem that the standard would be the same in either case. However,
some progress has been made since that case was decided and most jurisdictions
no longer hold that the only test to determine a man's sanity is whether he
knows right from wrong.
The courts of most jurisdiction today are willing to concede that a man
who has an uncontrollable impulse, which compels him to do, what otherwise
he would not do, is of unsound mind, and that an act committed by a man
so impelled, is not criminal. A man laboring under such an impulse is generally regarded from the point of view of criminal law, as incapable of committing a crime.
It may, however, be doubted, whether the will of the victim of such an
impulse would be set aside unless it were shown that the impulse was such
as to impel the victim to have made a will contrary to his own volition. Nor,
would it seem likely thai a will could be made under such circumstances for
the reason that wills are not made on the spur of the moment A lawyer, as a
rule, is consulted. A day or more generally elapses between the time the idea
is broached to the attorney and the time when it is signed. Under such
circumstances, it would be rather difficult to establish the fact that the document
was signed because of some .uncontrollable impulse. It'would seem, consequently that different standards and tests might be applied to determine the
question of insanity in a criminal and in a civil case.
In the case of Smith vs. State, 49 Southern 949, the court held the following
to be a correct instruction on the question of the defendant's sanity:
"The court charges the jury for the state: The defense of so-called moral
or emotional insanity or irresistible impulse, where the defendant's mental
power to distinguish between moral right and wrong with respect to the act
for which he is indicted remains unimpaired, is not recognized by the law
of the state; and you are accordingly instructed that you have no right to regard
any such insanity as a legal excuse for crime. If the defendant commits acrime unler an uncontrollable impulse resulting from mental disease, and
which, at the time and place of the alleged crime, exists to such. a high degree
that for the time it overwhelms his reason, judgment and conscience, and
his power to properly perceive the difference between the moral rig't and
wrong of the alleged criminal act, this would, of course, be a legal defense
and excuse for such an act. But where the defendant, at the time of an alleged
crime, is sane to the degree that he can properly perceive the- difference between
moral right .and wrong with respect to the particular act, and knows that it is
morally wrong for him to do the said act, then the mere fact that an alleged
irresistible or emotional impulse constrained him to commit the act which he
then properly perceived was morally wrong, will not, and cannot, amount to a
defense for crime in this state, and you are so instructed.
The court said:
"Whereas the defense is insanity, total or partial, the test of the defendant's criminal responsibility is his ability at the time he committed the act, to
?ealize and appreciate the nature and quality thereof-his ability to distinguish
right and wrong."
This, in other words, is practically going back to M'Naghten's case. We
had thought that- our American Courts in recent years had been getting away
from the "right and wrong test" as laid down in M'Naghten's case, and had
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hoped that they were willing to follow the medical profession and to accept
the tests laid down by it in determining a man's sanity.
After all, why is a man excused and held not guilty in the commission
of crime if he is found insane? Why do we set up different standards and
tests for the sane and the insane? Is not the underlying reason that the sane
man, according to the theory of our common law, has a free will and can
determine and choose for himself, while the insane man has not this freedom
of will. According to the common law the man who lacks a free will, lacks
the ability to have criminal intent. If he can not distinguish between right
and wrong, the freedom of will and the intent is certainly lacking. Is it not
as certainly lacking in a case where the poor victim is seized with an irresistible influence which impels him to do something which, if his will were
free, he would not do? In either case, the fundamental element of freedom
of the will is not present and because of its absence, crhninal intent is lacking.
Why should a court hold a man guilty inder such circumstances?

